Cybersecurity · 2026-08-10 · 15 min read
The Cyber Resilience Act From 11 September 2026: Who the 24-Hour Reporting Duty Actually Binds in the Mid-Market

Michael Kaiser
Co-Founder & Head of Systems, Vincency
In one month the first genuinely binding part of the Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, comes into application. From 11 September 2026, manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe security incidents within 24 hours. Three things about that date are widely misread. The duty arrives fifteen months before any security requirement it is supposed to enforce. It reaches products that were sold years ago. And the platform through which reports are meant to be filed is, as of the date of this article, still not open.
What applies on 11 September, and what does not
| Date | What | Who it touches |
|---|---|---|
| 10 Dec 2024 | Regulation entered into force | No operative duties yet |
| 11 Jun 2026 | Notifying authorities and conformity assessment procedures | Authorities and testing bodies, not companies |
| 11 Sep 2026 | Reporting duties, Article 14 | Every manufacturer in scope, including for legacy products |
| 11 Dec 2026 | Sufficient number of notified bodies available | Relevant later, for important and critical products |
| 11 Dec 2027 | Full application: essential requirements in Annex I, CE marking, technical documentation | Everything the regulation actually asks of a product |
The asymmetry in that table is the point, and it is rarely stated plainly. What starts in September is the obligation to report. The obligation to build products that meet the security requirements in Annex I, to document them, and to affix a CE marking on that basis, starts in December 2027. For a manufacturer that means a fifteen-month window in which every actively exploited vulnerability has to be reported to a public authority, while the product itself is not yet legally required to have been developed to the standard that would have prevented it.
That is not an oversight by the legislator. Reporting is what gives the authorities visibility before the substantive regime exists. But it does change how a company should sequence its work. Reading the CRA as a 2027 problem and scheduling the whole thing for next year is the single most common planning error we see right now, and it produces the same outcome in every case: the first report is written under time pressure by someone who has never written one.
The definition that catches companies that do not consider themselves manufacturers
Article 3(13) is short and worth reading twice. A manufacturer is a natural or legal person who develops or manufactures products with digital elements, or has products with digital elements designed, developed or manufactured, and markets them under its own name or trademark. The second half is what matters for the mid-market. Commissioning the work does not move the obligation to the party that did it. Putting your own logo on the result moves the obligation to you.
| Situation | In scope? | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Machine with networked controller, sold under your brand | Yes | Hardware product with digital elements, marketed under your name |
| App for your customers, built by an agency, published in your account | Yes | Had it developed, markets it under its own name, Art. 3(13) |
| Software product you license to customers | Yes | Software placed on the market |
| Customer portal that also drives a function of your device | Probably | Remote data processing solution under Art. 3(2) |
| Your company website, including shop and configurator | No | Operated, not placed on the market, and carries no product function |
| Third-party SaaS you use internally | No | You are the user, not the manufacturer |
The row that surprises people most is the second one. A company that has an app or a portal developed by an external partner and ships it under its own name is the manufacturer in the legal sense, and the partner is not. We say this as the partner in that arrangement: we build these systems, and the reporting duty still sits with our client, not with us. What can and should be arranged contractually is who technically detects, analyses and drafts. What cannot be arranged away is who is legally obliged to report.
Where the scope actually ends
Half the coverage of the CRA in the last months has been alarmist in a way that does not survive contact with Article 2. Websites, cloud services and SaaS offerings that stand on their own are not in scope. The regulation covers products placed on the market, and it explicitly draws in cloud components only where they are remote data processing solutions: software designed and developed by the manufacturer or under its responsibility, whose absence would prevent the product from performing one of its functions.
That gives you a usable test, and it is a technical question rather than a legal one. Switch the cloud service off in your head. If a customer's device or software then stops doing something it advertises, the service is part of the product. If the customer merely loses a dashboard, a reporting view or a marketing surface, it is not. Most mid-market companies we work with have exactly one component sitting near that line, and it is usually the portal that also delivers firmware updates or licence keys.
Legacy products are the part nobody plans for
Article 69(2) exempts products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 from the regulation, provided they are not substantially modified afterwards. Read on its own, that sounds like a long runway. Article 69(3) then removes it for the one duty that starts first: by way of derogation, the obligations in Article 14 apply to all products with digital elements within scope that were placed on the market before 11 December 2027.
In operational terms this is the heaviest sentence in the regulation for an established manufacturer. The reporting duty does not attach to your next release. It attaches to the installed base, including the controller version you shipped in 2021 and the appliance sitting at a customer who has not called since. Meeting a 24-hour deadline for a product you can still enumerate is a process problem. Meeting it for a fleet you cannot enumerate is not a process problem, it is a data problem, and it takes longer than a month to fix.
What a report looks like
| Stage | Deadline | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Early warning | 24 hours from becoming aware | That it happened, and which member states are affected |
| Notification | 72 hours | General information on the vulnerability or incident, plus any corrective or mitigating measures |
| Final report, vulnerability | 14 days after a corrective measure is available | Description, severity, impact, and the fix |
| Final report, incident | 1 month after the notification | Severity, impact, likely root cause, mitigations applied |
Note what the 24-hour stage does not require. It is an early warning, not an analysis. The most expensive mistake in the first year will be companies that miss the first deadline because they were still trying to understand the incident well enough to describe it properly. The regulation deliberately staged this: warn, then explain, then close.
The gap between the obligation and the tool
Reports are filed through the Single Reporting Platform operated by ENISA, which routes them to the CSIRT designated as coordinator in the member state of the manufacturer's main establishment. ENISA states the platform will be operational by 11 September 2026. As of the date of this article it is not open, there is no public registration URL, and what exists publicly is a factsheet plus two guidance documents on registration and submission, last updated on 31 July 2026.
This is worth saying without drama, because the practical conclusion is unambiguous. The deadlines in Article 14 do not depend on when the tool ships. A company that treats the missing platform as a reason to postpone its own preparation is optimising for the wrong risk. Build the internal process now, decide who is on call, write the templates, and register the moment ENISA opens the door. If you are inside the first weeks after 11 September and the platform is still not usable, document what you did and when, and contact the national CSIRT directly.
Germany: the BSI is the address
For manufacturers established in Germany, the BSI is the counterpart. The federal government named it as notifying and market surveillance authority, and the draft implementing act, Bundestag printed paper 21/6134, gives it four roles: market surveillance, notification of conformity assessment bodies, CSIRT coordinator and reporting point, and support for economic operators. The Bundesrat raised no objections in its first-round opinion on 12 June 2026.
One nuance is worth carrying forward from our piece on the AI Act: where a product falls under both the CRA and the high-risk regime of the AI Act, supervision is intended to follow the AI Act authority instead. For most mid-market manufacturers that combination will not arise. For anyone building AI into a regulated product, it decides who knocks.
And the point that removes the last excuse: the duty comes from the regulation, which applies directly in every member state. It does not wait for the national implementing act. The German law settles who supervises and how sanctions are administered here. It does not settle whether you have to report.
What a breach costs, and one exemption that catches a lot of readers
Article 64 tiers the penalties. Infringements of the essential requirements and of Articles 13 and 14 carry up to EUR 15 million or 2.5 percent of worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. A list of other obligations sits at EUR 10 million or 2 percent, and supplying incorrect or incomplete information to authorities at EUR 5 million or 1 percent.
More interesting than the ceilings is paragraph 10, which most summaries leave out. Administrative fines are not imposed on manufacturers that are microenterprises or small enterprises for failing to meet the deadline in Article 14(2)(a) or Article 14(4)(a). Those are precisely the two 24-hour early warnings. A small enterprise under the EU definition employs fewer than 50 people and has an annual turnover or balance sheet total of at most EUR 10 million.
What that exemption is not: a release from the duty. The obligation stands, the deadline stands, and neither the 72-hour notification nor the final report is covered. What falls away is the fine for a late early warning. For a company with 30 employees that takes the fear out of 11 September without taking away the work. For a company with 120 employees it does not apply at all, which is worth checking rather than assuming.
And realistically the exposure for a mid-market manufacturer is not the fine. Under Article 54 the market surveillance authority can restrict the making available of a product, withdraw it from the market or order a recall. A sales stop hits a product business harder and faster than a decision on penalties ever will.
What to do in the next four weeks
- Decide whether you are a manufacturer at all. One question, answered in writing: do we place a software or hardware product on the market under our own name. For roughly half the companies that ask us, the honest answer is no, and the whole topic ends there.
- List the products and the versions in the field. Including the ones nobody has touched in three years. Article 69(3) means the installed base is in scope, and this is the item with the longest lead time.
- Draw the line around your cloud components. For each one: would a product function fail without it. That answer determines scope, and it should be written down rather than assumed.
- Name who reports, and who covers them. Twenty-four hours includes nights and weekends. One named person plus one deputy, with a documented route to reach them, is the whole requirement here.
- Write the early warning template now. Half a page, fill in the blanks. The stage that has to be fast is the stage that should not need drafting.
- Set up a way to hear about vulnerabilities. A published security contact address, monitored. The formal disclosure policy is an Annex I item for December 2027, but without an inbox you will learn about an exploited vulnerability from a customer, and by then the clock has been running for a while.
- Put the reporting duty into supplier contracts. If a component vendor detects an exploited vulnerability, you need to hear about it inside your own 24 hours, not inside theirs.
Conclusion
The Cyber Resilience Act is generally filed under 2027, and for its substance that is right. Its first duty is not. From 11 September 2026 the 24-hour clock runs for every manufacturer in scope, for the whole installed base, and it runs whether or not the platform meant to receive the report is open. The work that closes the gap in the next four weeks is small and unglamorous: an honest answer on whether you are a manufacturer, a list of what is in the field, a named person, a template. The companies that get this wrong will not get it wrong on the law. They will get it wrong because on day one nobody knew who was supposed to press send. If you want that assessment done against your actual products rather than a checklist, that is what a first conversation is for, and the neighbouring regime is covered in our piece on the AI Act transparency duties.
Frequently asked questions about CRA reporting from September 2026
Does the Cyber Resilience Act apply to my website?
As a rule, no. The CRA covers products with digital elements, meaning software and hardware products placed on the market. A company website is not placed on the market, it is operated. Pure cloud and SaaS offerings also fall outside the scope as long as they do not carry a function of a product with digital elements. A cloud component only comes into scope once it is a remote data processing solution under Article 3(2), meaning it was designed and developed by the manufacturer or under its responsibility and its absence would prevent the product from performing one of its functions. The practical test is therefore not whether something runs in the cloud, but whether a product function fails without it.
Am I a manufacturer under the CRA if I have the software built for me?
Yes, and this is the most frequently missed provision in the regulation. Article 3(13) defines a manufacturer not only as a party that develops or manufactures itself, but expressly also as one that has products with digital elements designed, developed or manufactured and markets them under its own name or trademark. A company that commissions a machine controller, an app or a software product from a service provider and then ships it with its own logo carries the manufacturer obligations itself. The service provider does not. That belongs in the contract, not in a conversation after the incident.
What exactly do I have to report from 11 September 2026?
Two things. First, any actively exploited vulnerability in one of your products, where actively exploited means under Article 3 that there is reliable evidence a malicious actor has exploited it in a system without the permission of the system owner. Second, any severe incident that affects the ability of the product to protect the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data or functions. The mere existence of a vulnerability is not reportable as long as no exploitation is evidenced. The difference between a finding from a penetration test and an actually observed attack therefore determines whether the 24 hours start running.
Does the reporting duty cover products I sold years ago?
Yes. Article 69(2) generally exempts products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 from the regulation as long as they are not substantially modified. Paragraph 3 then makes an explicit exception for Article 14: the reporting obligations apply to all products with digital elements within scope that were placed on the market before that date. For a mid-market company that means the duty does not start with the next product release, it applies to the entire installed base. Anyone who does not know which versions are running at which customers has their first problem right here.
Where do I report while the ENISA platform is not yet live?
Reports go through the ENISA Single Reporting Platform to the CSIRT of the member state where the manufacturer has its main establishment; for Germany the draft implementing act designates the BSI. ENISA states the platform will be operational by 11 September 2026 but had not opened it as of the date of this article, and has so far published guidance documents and a factsheet, last updated 31 July 2026. In practice: the deadlines run from 11 September regardless of when the tool appears. The sensible move is to build the internal process now and plan the registration for the moment ENISA opens it, rather than waiting for the platform.
How high are the fines under the CRA?
Under Article 64, up to EUR 15 million or 2.5 percent of worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher, for infringements of the core obligations including the reporting duties. Other infringements carry a ceiling of EUR 10 million or 2 percent, and incorrect information supplied to authorities EUR 5 million or 1 percent. Smaller companies should note Article 64(10): no administrative fines are imposed on manufacturers that are microenterprises or small enterprises for failing to meet the deadline in Article 14(2)(a) or 14(4)(a), meaning a late 24-hour early warning. That does not remove the reporting duty itself, nor the 72-hour notification or the final report. For a mid-market company the realistic risk is not the fine but market surveillance: under Article 54 the authority can restrict the making available of a product, withdraw it from the market or order a recall.
What does preparing for the reporting duty cost?
For a mid-market company with one or two products in scope, the one-off effort in our experience runs to roughly EUR 4,000 to 11,000: about EUR 1,500 to 4,000 for the product inventory and scope assessment, EUR 2,000 to 5,000 for the reporting process with roles, availability and message templates, and EUR 800 to 2,000 for the vulnerability disclosure contact point and its publication. The larger item comes later and is not in that calculation: the essential requirements in Annex I, which apply from 11 December 2027 and reach into development depending on the product.
Sources, status and note: Primary source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (the Cyber Resilience Act), in particular Article 2 (scope), Article 3(1), (2) and (13) (definitions), Article 14 (reporting obligations), Article 54 (market surveillance measures), Article 64 including paragraph 10 (penalties and the exemption for microenterprises and small enterprises from fines for the Article 14(2)(a) and 14(4)(a) deadline), Article 69(2) and (3) (transitional provisions) and Article 71 (application). Reporting and platform status: European Commission, CRA reporting and ENISA, Single Reporting Platform, guidance documents last updated 31 July 2026; the platform was not publicly open at the time of writing. Germany: BSI on the Cyber Resilience Act and the draft implementing act, Bundestag printed paper 21/6134 of 26 May 2026; Bundesrat first-round opinion without objections, 12 June 2026. The cost ranges are our own project experience for mid-market companies with one or two products in scope, not published market figures. This article reflects the position as of 10 August 2026 and is a general overview, not legal advice; for binding information, consult a law firm specialising in IT and product compliance law. Transparency: Michael Kaiser is a co-founder of Vincency and the founder of ArkeonTech, and Vincency builds software and connected systems for the companies this article describes.
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